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In my remarks today, I provide a brief overview of the role of direct corporate borrowing versus bank 
loans in the process of economic development. In the earliest stages of economic development, firms 
finance investment by building up savings from internally generated funds. Self-funding is 
supplemented by loans from close relatives, extended family members, friends in the community and 
the like. Such “inside” funding overcomes information and credibility problems, and provides an 
incentive for owners to use the funds energetically, as promised. The borrower is bonded by its close 
relationship to family and community. Indeed, close relationships monitor the borrower’s behaviour 
and can enforce discipline on the borrower if need be. 
As an economy develops, self-funding and inside funding become insufficient to finance firms that 
must manage complex production processes and serve broader markets. Firms must attract additional 
financing from external sources. Banks arise to provide information-intensive external funding, and, in 
effect, recreate the kind of information, bonding and monitoring that come with family relationship 
lending, only with more funding. The cost of external funding through banks involves credit evaluation, 
loan monitoring, and a component to allow for the risk of default and the cost of managing a default if it 
occurs. These costs of external finance create an external finance premium that a borrower must pay 
over and above the opportunity cost of self-funding or funding from close associates. 
As an economy continues to develop, some firms need increasingly large external funds. Firms that 
are widely known can bypass information-intensive bank lending and access lenders directly with 
corporate bond funding. In the 19th century, railroads were among the first large-scale enterprises in 
the United States to borrow directly with long-term corporate bonds. Railroads were able to utilise 
direct bond finance because they had a relatively transparent public image and a physical capital 
structure (railroad tracks and cars) that was relatively easy to monitor. Hence, railroads reduced their 
external finance premium by borrowing directly from the public. More generally, firms with a good 
public image, which produce a product that is widely used and easily monitored, have an incentive to 
bypass bank loans in order to exploit their transparency to lower their external finance premium. 
Nevertheless, firms with direct access to the bond market continue to fund themselves in part with 
bank loans because banks provide a number of other financial services. These include: backstop 
financing with a line of credit; access to debtor-in-possession borrowing in the event of bankruptcy; 
customised borrowing (as opposed to standardised debt instruments used to access the credit market 
directly); and confidential borrowing, for instance when secrecy is needed for a borrower to 
appropriate the returns to investment financed with external funds. 
In addition, a firm that chooses to access the credit market directly with bond finance also needs 
investment banking services. For instance, bonds sold by railroads in the 19th century United States 
were underwritten by elite Wall Street investment banks. Investment bank services include: an 
endorsement of the creditworthiness of corporate bonds; the pricing and sale of initial public offerings; 
the marketing of bonds overseas; a market in which the corporate bonds can be bought and sold; the 
leadership of a creditor committee in the event of a default; and the leadership of equity receiverships 
in judicial reorganisations during bankruptcy.  
Too much reliance on bank loans or direct bond finance, however, exposes a firm to excessive risk of 
bankruptcy in the event of default. Hence, in developed economies firms have come to rely on a 
portfolio of external finance that usually includes substantial equity, as well as bond and bank loan 
finance. Equity finance gives a firm financial flexibility in the choice of the payment of dividends - 
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flexibility that a firm can utilise to avoid default on bank loans or bonds. Outside equity, however, 
involves a cost of its own: too much of it blunts the incentive of managers to run a firm efficiently 
because external ownership allows managers to retain only a fraction of every dollar of value they 
create for the firm above revenue needed to pay off fixed obligations, which include debt and fixed 
salaries. Therefore, equity, bank loans and bonds generally coexist in the capital structure of modern 
corporate borrowers. 
A market for direct debt also improves the incentive for banks to remain efficient and to innovate. A 
market for short- and long-term corporate debt disciplines and ultimately strengthens the banking 
system by providing competition for information-intensive bank loans at the margin. Banks have an 
incentive to be efficient in order to retain clients with actual or potential access to direct finance. A 
market for direct debt encourages banks to innovate because products initially created and 
customised by banks often have the potential to be commoditised, standardised and moved from 
banks to capital markets, which provide them at lower overhead cost. In the United States, bank loans 
and bankers’ acceptances predated commercial paper and other direct money market debt. More 
recently, banks helped to create money market mutual funds, futures markets, junk bonds and asset-
backed securities, all of which then moved outside the banking system to a large degree. By 
encouraging innovation, competition among banks and non-bank financial markets helps to improve 
the distribution of financial risk in the economy and lower the cost of external finance. 
The growth of non-bank debt finance also improves the resilience of the financial system. Chairman 
Greenspan has emphasised this “spare tyre” role of the capital market - direct, non-bank bond finance 
- in cushioning the effect of financial distress on the macroeconomy. In a well-known 1999 speech, 
Chairman Greenspan emphasised that “[m]ultiple alternatives to transform an economy’s savings into 
capital investment provide back-up facilities for credit flows should primary intermediation fail”.
2 He 
noted, for instance, that the 1990 collapse of real estate collateral that hurt bank lending in the United 
States did not interrupt mortgage lending much because of the deep market in mortgage-backed 
securities. He also pointed out that the protracted banking crisis in Japan hurt the macroeconomy 
more than might have been the case if non-bank capital markets had been widely developed in Japan. 
I would like to conclude by emphasising that long-term, local currency corporate bonds can efficiently 
hedge real future retirement, pension, life insurance and entitlement commitments. However, such 
bonds can do so only if the purchasing power of the currency is preserved over long periods of time. A 
credible domestic monetary policy is necessary for long-term, local currency corporate bonds to be 
demanded domestically as a hedge against long-term commitments. The demand for local currency 
corporate debt abroad also depends in large part on confidence in a stable purchasing power of local 
currency. In the 19th century, US railroad bonds were marketed successfully in Great Britain in large 
part because the United States was on a gold standard. 
On the other hand, the public is greatly disadvantaged if it must hold retirement savings in short-term 
bank deposits. Households forced to save in bank deposits earn relatively low interest on average, 
and they are exposed to the risk that short-term interest rates might fall to very low levels for long 
periods of time. So, bank deposits are a poor hedge against retirement needs. If the government 
stabilises the purchasing power of the currency credibly, and households can hold their savings in a 
diversified portfolio of high-grade, local currency, long-term corporate bonds, they can earn a higher 
stable real return with relatively little credit risk. 
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